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1. StAtuS And effeCtS of the eChr on domeStiC legAl SyStemS
1.1. Overview of the Status and Impact of the ECHR in the Contracting Parties’ 
Legal Systems
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), unlike classic in-
ternational treaties, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) “compris-
es more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, 
over and above, a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations 
which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a “collective enforcement”.1 
From Article 1 of the Convention, in particular, it follows that “the primary respon-
sibility for implementing and enforcing the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention is laid on the national authorities”,2 and especially on national courts, 
whose role in making the ECHR effective in domestic legal orders is of the utmost 
importance.3
By ratifying the ECHR, the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their 
domestic legislation is compatible with it.4 So, a breach of the ECHR can result 
from the mere existence of a law which introduces, directs or authorizes meas-
ures incompatible with the minimum standard of protection guaranteed by the 
Convention. Nonetheless, in order to establish that this minimum standard has been 
violated, reference should be made to the manner national authorities interpret and 
apply in concreto the Convention. The absence of a law expressly prohibiting a 
violation is not sufficient in itself to establish a breach since such a prohibition 
does not represent the sole method of securing the enjoyment of the rights and 
* While the authors equally share the responsibility for the entire essay, section 1 is by Nicola 
Napoletano and section 2 is by Andrea Caligiuri.
** Researcher in International Law, University of Macerata.
*** Researcher in International Law, University Unitelma Sapienza (Rome)
1 See ECtHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71, Judgment of 18 
January 1978, para. 239.
2 See ECtHR, Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], Application No. 75529/01, Judgment of 8 June 
2006, para. 97.
3 See Stone Sweet and Keller, “The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders”, 
in Keller and Stone Sweet (eds.), A Europe of Rights. The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems, Oxford, 2008, p. 3 ff.
4 This principle has been held by the ECtHR on many occasions; see, recently, ECtHR, 
Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], Application No. 34932/04, Judgment of 6 January 2011, para. 119.
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freedoms guaranteed.5 Moreover, as the ECHR guarantees the availability at na-
tional level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and 
freedoms,6 Contracting States must provide all necessary remedies under domestic 
law in order to prevent alleged violations of the Convention or their continuation, 
or to provide adequate redress for any violation already occurred.7
The ECHR leaves it to the States parties to decide how to comply with their 
duty to observe the provisions of the Convention. As stated by the ECtHR, indeed, 
the ECHR does not lay down for the Contracting States “any given manner for 
ensuring within their internal law the effective implementation” of any of the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed.8 Moreover, in the James and Others and in the Lithgow 
and Others cases,9 the ECtHR held that States are not requested to incorporate the 
Convention into domestic law, but that “the substance of the rights and freedoms 
set forth must be secured under the domestic legal order, in some form or another, 
to everyone within the jurisdiction of the Contracting States”.10
The mere incorporation of the ECHR into a domestic legal system is, therefore, 
neither able to solve all the problems related to its application nor to guarantee the 
faithful and effective application of the Convention in the domestic legal system 
of the Contracting States. It is important, therefore, to analyze the status and the 
effects of the ECHR in domestic legal orders, assuming that the strength of the im-
pact of the Convention on national legal system11 mainly depends on two aspects: 
1) the position of the ECHR in the domestic hierarchy of sources of law, that is to 
5 See ECtHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cit. supra note 1, para. 240.
6 The mechanism of complaint to the ECtHR is thus subsidiary to national systems safe-
guarding human rights. According to the ECtHR, the subsidiary character of the Convention 
is articulated in Article 13 and Article 35(1) ECHR (see ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
[GC], Application No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011, para. 287; Scordino v. Italy (No. 
1) [GC], Application No. 36813/97, Judgment of 29 March 2006, para. 140; Cocchiarella v. Italy 
[GC], Application No. 64886/01, Judgment of 29 March 2006, para. 38; and Kudła v. Poland 
[GC], Application No. 30210/96, Judgment of 26 October 2000, para. 152). Therefore, subsidi-
arity can be considered as a basic principle in the process of implementation of the Convention. 
On this point, see petzold, “The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity”, in mACdonAld, 
mAtSCher and petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, The 
Hague, 1993, p. 59 ff.
7 See ECtHR, Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], cit. supra note 2, para. 98-99
8 See ECtHR, Swedish Engine Drivers Union, Application No. 5614/72, Judgment of 6 
February 1976, para. 50.
9 See ECtHR, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8793/79, Judgment 
of 21 February 1986, para. 84, and Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 
9006/80, 9262/81, 9263/81, 9265/81, 9266/81, 9313/81, 9405/81, Judgment of 8 July 1986, para. 
205.
10 See also ECtHR, Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgment of 
7 July 1989, para. 120.
11 See BlACKBurn and polAKiewiCz (eds.), Fundamental Rights in Europe. The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Its Member States, 1950-2000, Oxford, 2001; Keller and 
Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3; mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), The National Judicial 
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say whether it has a supra-legislative status in domestic legal orders and, therefore, 
prevails over conflicting national laws enacted before or after the ratification and 
the entry in to force of the Convention itself; and 2) the self-executing character of 
the ECHR rules and the possibility that the European Convention rights be directly 
enforced by national courts.12
There are different approaches and a variety of constitutional provisions con-
cerning the status, the application and the effects of the ECHR in the domestic legal 
orders. Moreover, the direct application of the European Convention provisions at 
national level,13 the judicial enforcement of conventional rights and the judicial 
review of legislative and executive acts with reference to the ECHR differ from 
one State to another.14 In addition, no express obligation to give direct effect to the 
ECHR within domestic legal orders is included in the text of the Convention.
In the majority of Contracting Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as 
in the Netherlands,15 following a monist approach16 that considers international and 
domestic law as part of the same legal system, the Convention substantive rights 
are self-executing and enjoy supremacy over national legislation. The ECHR pro-
Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective, Groningen, 
2010.
12 See CAtAldi, “La natura self-executing delle norme della CEDU e l’applicazione del-
le sentenze della Corte europea negli ordinamenti nazionali”, in CAligiuri, CAtAldi and 
nApoletAno (eds.), La tutela dei diritti umani in Europa tra sovranità statale e ordinamenti 
sovranazionali, Padova, 2010, p. 565 ff.
13 Concerning the literature about the direct applicability of the ECHR in the Contracting 
States, see CAtAldi, “Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e ordinamento italiano. Una 
storia infinita?”, DUDI, 2008, p. 321 ff., at p. 328, notes 18, 19 e 20.
14 For practical reasons, it is not possible to cover all of the Contracting Parties’ domestic 
legal orders; only some of them have been analysed taking into account the different legal tradi-
tions.
15 See de wet, “The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium”, in Keller and 
Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 229 ff., p. 235 ff.: “The relationships between domestic 
and international law in the Netherlands is characterized by a monist character [Article 93 of the 
Dutch Constitution] and the supreme position of international law in the Dutch constitutional 
order [Article 94 of the Dutch Constitution]”.
16 As far as the relationship between the domestic and international legal systems is con-
cerned, France can be considered “formally” monist. According to Article 55 of the French 
Constitution, the ECHR has been automatically incorporated into the domestic legal order since 
its publication and it is directly applicable. Regarding the rank in the hierarchy of sources of laws, 
international treaty law has supra-legislative, but infra-constitutional status. The Constitutional 
Council has the sole competence to review the constitutionality of law before they enter into 
force. The Council of State and the Court of Cassation can review the compatibility of national 
legislation with the ECHR and, if it is inconsistent, they can disapply domestic law. See lAmBert 
ABdelgAwAd and weBer, “The Reception Process in France and Germany”, in Keller and 
Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 107 ff., at p. 115 ff. See also Sorel, “La France et la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, variations sur les amours d’un couple tumultueux”, in 
CAligiuri, CAtAldi and nApoletAno (eds.), cit. supra note 12, p. 621 ff.; fArtunovA, “Report 
on France”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), cit. supra note 11, p. 205 ff.
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visions create enforceable rights for individuals at level of statutory law or consti-
tutional law, or at an intermediate level above statutes but below the Constitution, 
which can be judicially enforced even in the absence of any further domestic meas-
ure for implementation.
In countries that have ratified the Convention more recently, and specifically 
in the vast majority of the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
ECHR has been automatically incorporated through the reference operated by a con-
stitutional rule, which usually recognizes a super-legislative rank to international 
treaties in the domestic hierarchy of sources of law. For instance, the ECHR enjoys 
a particular status within the Bulgarian legal order as specified in the Constitution 
of 1991. Its incorporation in the Bulgarian legal system is expressly stated in Article 
5(4) of the Constitution, which reads: “International treaties which have been rati-
fied in accordance with the constitutional procedure, promulgated and having come 
into force with respect to the Republic of Bulgaria, shall be part of the legislation of 
the State. They shall have primacy over any conflicting provision of the domestic 
legislation”. According to the aforementioned Article 5(4), in the domestic hier-
archy of source of law the ECHR is placed above statutes and laws but below the 
Constitution. Article 5(1) of the Constitution, indeed, states that the “Constitution 
shall be the supreme law, and no other law shall contravene it”.17 Another example is 
the 1991 Constitution of Romania,18 which provides that “[t]reaties lawfully ratified 
by Parliament shall form an integral part of the domestic legal order” (Article 11(2)). 
Moreover, according to Article 20 of the Romanian Constitution: 
“[The] constitutional provisions on citizens’ rights and liberties shall 
be interpreted and applied in accordance […] with the covenants and 
other treaties to which Romania is a party. […] In the event of conflict 
between the covenants and treaties on fundamental human rights to 
which Romania is a party and domestic laws, the international instru-
ments shall prevail”.
As far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, Article 4 of the Constitution 
reads: 
“Constitutional provisions for human rights and freedoms shall be 
understood and implemented in accordance […] with other conven-
tions and treaties to which the Republic of Moldova is a party. […] 
Wherever inconsistencies appear between human rights conventions 
17 See fArtunovA, “Report on Bulgaria”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), cit. supra 
note 11, p. 101 ff., p. 113.
18 See rAduCu, “Report on Romania”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), ibid., p. 369 
ff.
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and treaties signed by the Republic of Moldova and its own national 
laws, international regulations shall prevail”.
Moreover, Article 8 of the Constitution provides that “The Republic of Moldova 
is obliged to respect […] the treaties to which it is a party […]”.19
Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries (the ECHR was incorporated into 
Swedish and Norwegian law through ordinary statutes: the Swedish Act on the 
ECHR of 1995 and the Act on Strengthening of the Status of Human Rights in 
Norwegian Law of 1999),20 but also Italy21 and Germany,22 have traditionally sup-
ported a dualistic approach, according to which international law and domestic law 
are two separate and distinct legal orders.
The United Kingdom and Ireland, for example, have respectively incorporated 
the Convention through the Human Rights Act of 1998 (entered into force in 2000) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights Act of 2003.23 In both countries, 
the reception of the European Convention made it “an immediate source of rights 
against national authorities and, in case of violation, a source of remedies before 
national courts”.24 After incorporation, the ECHR rules are judicially enforceable 
19 See also Law No. 595-XIV of 29 September 1999 concerning the International Treaties of 
the Republic of Moldova. The relevant provisions of this law read as follow: “International trea-
ties shall be complied with in good faith, in accordance with the principle pacta sunt servanda. 
The Republic of Moldova cannot invoke the provisions of its internal legislation as a justification 
for non-compliance with an international treaty to which it is a party” (Section 19 Compliance 
with international treaties); “The provisions of the international treaties which, according to their 
wording, are susceptible to be applicable without there being need for enactment of special leg-
islative acts, shall have an enforceable character and shall be directly applied in the Moldovan 
law system. For the realisation of other provisions of the treaties, special normative acts shall be 
adopted” (Section 20 The application of international treaties).
20 See leBeCK, “Report on Scandinavian Countries”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), 
cit. supra note 11, p. 389 ff., p. 393 ff.; wiKlund, “The Reception Process in Sweden and 
Norway”, in Keller and Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 165 ff., p. 182 ff.
21 Concerning the status and the effects of the ECHR on Italian legal order, see infra section 
1.2.
22 BVerfGE 111, 307 (BVerfG, Görgülü, 2 BvR 1481/04, Order of 14 October 2004), para. 
34. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the “Basic Law is clearly based on the classic 
idea that the relationship of public international law and domestic law is a relationship between 
two different legal spheres and that the nature of this relationship can be determined from the 
viewpoint of domestic law only by domestic law itself”.
23 See SApienzA, “L’‘incorporation’ della Convenzione europea dei diritti umani nell’or-
dinamento britannico attraverso lo Human Rights Act del 1998”, in CAligiuri, CAtAldi and 
nApoletAno (eds.), cit. supra note 12, p. 609 ff.; id., “Convenzione europea dei diritti umani e 
Human Rights Act 1998: in margine all’obbligo delle corti inglesi to take into account la giuri-
sprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo”, DUDI, 2008, p. 253 ff.; KilKelly (ed.), ECHR and Irish 
Law, 2nd ed., Bristol, 2004.
24 See BeSSon, “The Reception Process in Ireland and the United Kingdom”, in Keller and 
Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 31 ff., at p. 32. See also BlACK-BrAnCh, “Parliamentary 
Supremacy or Political Expediency?: The Constitutional Position of the Human Rights Act un-
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by national courts and directly applicable within the British and Irish legal systems 
by courts and other public authorities.25
In particular in the United Kingdom, Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act re-
quires primary and subordinate legislation to be interpreted, taking into account the 
decisions of the Strasbourg Court (Section 2), in a way which is “as far as possible” 
compatible with the Convention rights. From paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) of Section 
3, one can infer a contrario that courts can declare subordinate legislation invalid 
if it cannot be interpreted consistently with the ECHR, unless primary legislation 
prevents removal of the incompatibility. In the 2008, in In re P case,26 the House of 
Lords made reference to Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act, thereby preventing 
authorities from acting in violation of a right protected by the ECHR. In fact, the 
House of Lords held that if a piece of legislation cannot be interpreted consistently 
with the ECHR, it must be disapplied by domestic courts.27 On the other hand, in 
any proceeding in which a court determines that a provision of primary legislation 
is not compatible with a Convention right, it can declare this inconsistency (Section 
4(2)). However, according to the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy that forbids 
the judicial review of statutes, those provisions cannot be disapplied or declared 
invalid. As provided by Section 4(6), a “declaration of incompatibility”, indeed, 
“does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement” of the provision 
of domestic legislation, nor does it bind the parties to the proceedings in which it is 
made. Although the Parliament is not bound by the declaration of incompatibility, 
Section 10 establishes a special fast-track procedure to make those amendments to 
the legislation deemed necessary to remove the incompatibility with the ECHR. 
Finally, Section 6 makes it unlawful for a public authority “to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right”, unless obliged to do so by primary legisla-
tion. The Human Rights Act has generated much literature and some criticisms, 
but it has “proven reasonably effective in the UK. In fact, it has allowed judicial 
review of primary legislation without overriding the supremacy of Parliament. […] 
However, within the UK, the effect of the Human Rights Act has frequently been 
described as constitutional”,28 considering the “political pressure” on Parliament 
to amend the law resulting from a declaration of incompatibility issued by a court, 
as well as the supra-legislative rank of the ECHR rights in British law that binds 
der British Law”, Statute Law Review, 2002, p. 59 ff.; elliot, “Parliamentary Sovereignty and 
the New Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political Reality and Convention”, Legal 
Studies, 2002, p. 340 ff.
25 See BeSSon, cit. supra note 24, pp. 42 and 46.
26 See House of Lords, In re P and others (AP) (Appellants) (Northern Ireland) [2008] 
UKHL 38.
27 See AndenAS and Bjorge, “Giudici nazionali e interpretazione evolutiva della 
Convenzione europea dei diritti umani. La prospettiva inglese, francese e tedesca”, DUDI, 2010, 
p. 471 ff., at p. 476.
28 See murphy, “Report on the UK and Ireland”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), cit. 
supra note 11, p. 479 ff., p. 491.
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courts to interpret domestic legislation in conformity with the Convention or to 
declare its incompatibility with the Convention.29
In the German legal system, according to Article 59(2) of the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), the ECHR has been incorporated by a formal statute (Act on the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
7 August 1952). Consequently, the Convention enjoys the status and the rank 
of a federal statute,30 and it does not automatically have priority over other fed-
eral law. In its Decision of 14 October 2004, the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) stated that the guarantees provided by the 
ECHR, due to its status in the hierarchy of norms, “are not a direct constitutional 
standard of review in the German legal system. A complainant can therefore not di-
rectly challenge the violation of a human right contained in the ECHR by a consti-
tutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court”.31 However, the Court 
has held that the European Convention must be taken into account when interpret-
ing domestic law, including fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees. The 
ECHR can, indeed,
“influence the interpretation of the fundamental rights and constitu-
tional principles of the Basic Law. The text of the Convention and the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights serve, on the level 
of constitutional law, as guides to interpretation in determining the 
content and scope of fundamental rights and constitutional principles 
of the Basic Law, provided that this does not lead to a restriction or 
reduction of protection of the individual’s fundamental rights under 
the Basic Law”.32
Therefore, German authorities and national courts are obliged, under the afore-
mentioned conditions, to take into account the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR 
in their decisions. As a consequence, even if the ECHR does not automatically have 
priority over other federal law, German authorities and national courts are under an 
obligation to take notice of the Convention provision as interpreted by the ECHR 
and apply it to the case, provided that the application does not violate constitutional 
law.33 Accordingly, as pointed out by some scholars, the ECHR has “a quasi-con-
29 See BeSSon, cit. supra note 24, p. 50.
30 BVerfGE 111, 307, cit. supra note 22, para. 62. See lAmBert ABdelgAwAd and weBer, 
cit. supra note 16, p. 107 ff., p. 118 ff. 
31 BVerfGE 111, 307, cit. supra note 22, para. 32. See hArtwig, “Much Ado About Human 
Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights”, 
German Law Journal, 2005, p. 869 ff.; Beljin, “Bundesverfassungsgericht on the Status of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and ECHR Decisions in the German Legal Order. 
Decision of 14 October 2004”, ECLR, 2005, p. 553 ff.
32 BVerfGE 111, 307, cit. supra note 22, para. 32.
33 Ibid., paras. 46 and 62-64.
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stitutional influence for the purpose of the application of most of the Basic Law’s 
fundamental rights”34 that, as recently maintained by the Federal Constitutional 
Court in its Decision of 4 May 201135, are to be interpreted in a manner that is 
open to international law. According to the Court36, an interpretation “open to in-
ternational law” does not require the fundamental rights and rule-of-law principles 
enshrined in the Basic Law to be “schematically aligned” with those of the ECHR 
but requires “its valuations to be taken on to the extent that this is methodically 
justifiable and compatible with the Basic Law’s standards”. Furthermore, the deci-
sions of the ECtHR, which contain new aspects for the interpretation of the Basic 
Law, “are equivalent to legally relevant changes, which may lead to the final and 
binding effect of a Federal Constitutional Court decision being transcended”.
The constitutions of some Contracting States reserve a special status to interna-
tional human rights treaties (see, respectively, Article 10 of the Spanish Constitution 
and Article 16 of the Portuguese Constitution). More specifically, the relevant pro-
visions of the Spanish Constitution read as follows: “Provisions relating to the fun-
damental rights and the freedoms recognised by the Constitution shall be construed 
in accordance with […] international treaties and agreements on human rights that 
have been ratified by Spain” (Article 10(2)); “Once officially published in Spain, 
international treaties that have been validly concluded shall be part of the domes-
tic legal order” (Article 96(1)). The Spanish Constitution confers a “supra-legisla-
tive” rank to the ECHR, that is placed above domestic legislation and below the 
Constitution.37 Hence, domestic legislation may not, even if enacted subsequently, 
modify or derogate from an international treaty. Moreover, the ECHR has an “in-
fra-constitutional” rank; this status derives from Article 95(1) of the Constitution, 
which states that if an international treaty contains provisions incompatible with 
the Constitution, its ratification requires a previous amendment of the Constitution 
itself. Finally, Article 10(2) requires that constitutional fundamental rights must 
be interpreted consistently with international human rights treaties, thus with the 
ECHR. The Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has repeatedly 
maintained that ECHR can integrate the content of constitutional rights, having 
a special relevance for the interpretation of those rights. However, the ECHR is 
not an autonomous parameter under which domestic legislation can be reviewed, 
having a special relevance for the interpretation of constitutional rights.38 As far as 
34 See Cede, “Report on Austria and Germany”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), cit. 
supra note 11, p. 55 ff., p. 62 ff.
35 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2365/09; 2 BvR 740/10; 2 BvR 2333/08; 2 BvR 1152/10; 2 BvR 571/10 
of 4 May 2011.
36 See English Press release No. 31 of 4 May 2011 is available at: <http://www.bundesver-
fassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg11-031en.html>.
37 See CAndelA SoriAno, “The Reception Process in Spain and Italy”, in Keller and 
Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 393 ff., p. 403 ff.
38 See torreS pérez, “Report on Spain”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), cit. supra 
note 11, p. 457 ff., p. 461 ff.
THE APPLICATION OF THE ECHR IN THE DOMESTIC SYSTEMS 133
ordinary courts are concerned, since international treaties cannot be amended or 
derogated from by domestic legislation, the Tribunal Constitucional has ruled out 
that national courts may set aside legislation clashing with the ECHR, or, in case 
of doubt, they may raise a question of constitutionality asking the Constitutional 
Court to review the compatibility of domestic legislation with a fundamental right 
protected by the ECHR and the Constitution.39
Only few Contracting Parties have acknowledged a constitutional status of 
the European Convention. For instance, in Austria the ECHR has been incorpo-
rated into the domestic constitutional order and is directly applicable – even if 
Austria has always denied any direct applicability of international human rights 
treaties.40 This, therefore, determines that: a) the ECHR is a directly binding stand-
ard under which ordinary laws may be reviewed by the Constitutional Court; b) 
the ECHR grants individual rights that are directly actionable before all national 
courts and authorities, which are obliged to interpret ordinary law consistently 
with the Convention.
However, it must be noted that, lacking a formal incorporation, more spe-
cifically made by a formal act of the Parliament, the practice has recorded an 
increasing recourse to the “indirect incorporation” of the Convention, that is to 
say the incorporation made by national courts interpreting domestic legislation 
in the sense the most consistent with international obligations lying upon States, 
through the well known criterion of the so called “consistent interpretation”. As 
mentioned above, the ECHR is seen as interpretative tool in relation to national 
constitutional provisions in the field of human rights. The fundamental principle 
is, therefore, that the interpretation of national rights be inspired by the evolution 
of the ECHR. As a consequence, the different national legal orders and the ECHR 
system influence one another and mutually stimulate.41 In fact, regardless of the 
formal position set out by the different constitutional texts and regardless of the 
monistic or dualistic approach,42 some scholars have recently underlined that there 
39 Ibid., pp. 465 and 473.
40 See thurnher, “The Reception Process in the Austria and Switzerland”, in Keller and 
Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 311 ff., p. 325 ff. 
41 See AndenAS and Bjorge, cit. supra note 27, p. 485 ff.
42 See Keller and Stone Sweet, “Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems”, in Keller and Stone Sweet (eds.), cit. supra note 3, p. 677 ff., p. 685 ff.: “[T]here is 
no necessary causal linkage between ex ante monism or dualism, on one hand, and the reception 
of the ECHR on the other. Put differently, the manner in which the ECHR is incorporated is an 
outcome of the reception process which will, in turn, impinge on reception ex post. The assump-
tion that dualistic States have, a priori, an unfriendly attitude towards international law, and will, 
therefore, generate a relatively poorer rights record, is untenable. […] Dualistic countries tend 
to incorporate through statute, whereas monist States tend to do so through judicial decisions. 
Clearly, a monistic constitutional structure can provide the judiciary with more leeway in the re-
ception process […] helping courts overcome certain obstacles when they are motivated to do so. 
Finally, in dualistic countries where a powerful Constitutional or Supreme Court defends national 
human rights, we observe reticence among judges to base their rulings on the Convention as an 
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is a “progressive rapprochement between the European legal orders with regard to 
the ‘position’ of the ECHR in the domestic legal order, which has been promoted 
by national legislators, by Constitutional or the Supreme Courts, and sometimes 
the ordinary judges”.43
In conclusion, the legal framework governing the application and the effects 
of the ECHR in the domestic legal orders is so variegated that, according to some 
scholars, it is necessary to develop
“a new, more comprehensive realistic theory. […] [This new theory] 
should not only accept that the reality is more complex and that, just 
as there are various shades of black and white, so there are various 
shades of monism and dualism, […] [but should be able to] tell us: 
whether domestic courts apply the Convention by relying only on the 
wording of the Convention or (as they should) also on the case law of 
the European Court; or whether they apply only domestic law, but so 
as to harmonize it with the Convention and the Court’s case-law; or 
whether they give priority only to earlier or also to subsequent statu-
tory and/or constitutional law”.44
1.2. Focus on the Status and Effects of the ECHR in the Italian Legal System
The Italian Constitution recognizes a particular status to international law, dis-
tinguishing between customary law and treaty law (Articles 10(1) and 117(1) of 
the Italian Constitution). After the constitutional reform of 2001, which introduced 
a new Article 117(1) according to which “[l]egislative powers shall be vested in 
the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the con-
straints deriving from EU-legislation and international obligations”, the Italian 
Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) has had different occasions to rule on 
the issue of the relationship between the ECHR and the Italian legal system, in par-
ticular focusing on the distinction between those competences that are a preroga-
tive of the Court itself and those that can be exercised by any other domestic court 
while interpreting and applying the Convention.
independent source of rights. […] Paradoxically, perhaps, a pre-existing human rights judicial 
tradition in a particular country can sometimes hamper reception of the Convention or, at least, 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR”.
43 See mArtiniCo, “National Judges and Supranational Laws: Goals and Structure of the 
Research”, in mArtiniCo and polliCino (eds.), cit. supra note 11, p. 7 ff., p. 13.
44 See wildhABer, “The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law”, 
ICLQ, 2007, p. 217 ff., p. 219.
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1.2.1. Status of the ECHR
Concerning the status of the ECHR, the Corte Costituzionale maintains that 
Article 117(1) of the Italian Constitution has filled the gap hitherto existing in the 
rules that guarantee compliance with international treaty obligations at a constitu-
tional level, establishing, as a consequence, that a conflict between a rule of domes-
tic law and a rule of international treaty law, in particular of the ECHR, amounts 
to a violation of Article 117(1).45 Moreover, while excluding that Article 117(1) 
confers constitutional rank to international treaty law incorporated into the Italian 
legal system – the ECHR was ratified and implemented by Italy by Law No. 848 
of 4 August 1955, having therefore formally the rank of ordinary law –, the Court 
has specified that the expression “international obligations” mentioned in it refers 
to international treaty rules different from those referred to by the provisions of 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution. Therefore, Article 117(1), with its inherent 
mechanism of “mobile reference” (rinvio mobile), mandates the verification of the 
constitutionality of any ordinary law in light of any relevant rule of international 
treaty law, thus the ECHR itself.
In particular, in its Decisions Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007,46 the Corte Costituzionale 
held, with reference to Article 117(1), that the provisions of the ECHR must be con-
sidered as “intermediate rules” (norme interposte) – i.e. in the domestic hierarchy 
of sources of law, ECHR rules are midway between the Constitution and ordinary 
legislation and integrate a parameter of constitutionality for reviewing national leg-
islation (Decision No. 349 of 2007, para. 6.2) – and that their specificity lies in the 
fact that they are subject to the interpretation of the Strasbourg Court, to which 
Contracting Parties are obliged to conform (Decision No. 349 of 2007, para. 5). 
Even if the Italian Constitution does not expressly refer to the ECHR and even if 
45 Before the constitutional reform of 2001, the Corte di Cassazione, in its Decision of 10 
July 1993 No. 2194, issued in the Medrano case, recognized to the ECHR rules “a particular 
force of resistance in respect to ordinary subsequent laws”. Moreover, the Corte Costituzionale 
(19 January 1993, No. 10) stated that the rules of international treaty law introduced in the do-
mestic legal system “derive from an atypical competence of the State, as such insusceptible of 
being abrogated or modified by means of ordinary law”.
46 See Corte Costituzionale, 24 October 2007, Nos. 348 (R.A. v. Comune di Torre Annunziata; 
Comune di Montello v. A.C.; M.T.G. v. Comune di Ceprano) and 349 (E.P. et al. v. Comune di 
Avellino et al.; A.G. et al. v. Comune di Leonforte et al.), IYIL, Vol. XVII, 2007, p. 292 ff. (com-
mentary by CAtAldi). On these decisions see also the contributions by BArtole, Condorelli, 
CAretti, CAtAldi, and pAdelletti, in DUDI, 2008, p. 291 ff., and by gAjA, CAnnizzAro, 
pAdelletti, and SACCuCCi, in RDI, 2008, p. 136 ff.; Conforti, “La Corte costituzionale e gli 
obblighi internazionali dello stato in tema di espropriazione”, Giur. It., 2008, p. 569 ff.; villAni, 
“Sul valore della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’ordinamento italiano”, Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, 2008, p. 7 ff.; teSAuro, “Costituzione e norme esterne”, DUE, 
2009, p. 195 ff.; pedrAzzi, “La CEDU nell’ordinamento italiano”, in CAligiuri, CAtAldi and 
nApoletAno (eds.), cit. supra note 12, p. 595 ff.; nApoletAno, “Rango ed efficacia delle norme 
della CEDU nella recente giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale”, DUDI, 2010, p. 194 ff.
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the Convention rules do not automatically prevail over conflicting domestic rules – 
in the sense the conflicts between the ECHR and domestic laws cannot be directly 
resolved by ordinary courts, but must be referred to the Corte Costituzionale –, 
the ECHR binds the legislator considering that its rules are an indirect parameter 
for constitutional review of domestic laws. As a consequence, any domestic law in 
conflict with the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR indirectly violates the Italian 
Constitution and can be repealed by the Corte Costituzionale (this approach has 
been confirmed by the Corte Costituzionale in many subsequent decisions: No. 39 
of 2008; Nos. 311 and 317 of 2009; Nos. 138, 187 and 196 of 2010; Nos. 1, 80 and 
113 of 2011).
1.2.2. Role of Domestic Courts
As far as the role of domestic courts is concerned, the Corte Costituzionale 
states that, in case of conflict between a domestic law and the ECHR, the “com-
mon” judge shall construe the former consistently with the Convention “to the 
extent that this is allowed by comparing the text of the two provisions and using 
all the standard tools of legal hermeneutics”.47 If the conflict between the two rules 
cannot be solved by way of interpretation, the Corte Costituzionale has held that 
“the common judge […] must raise a plea of unconstitutionally […] with reference 
to the parameter of Article 117(1) of the Constitution and, if it is a treaty rule co-
inciding with a generally recognized rule of international law, to the parameter of 
Article 10(1) of the Constitution as well” (Decision No. 311 of 2009, para. 6).
As a consequence, domestic courts do not have the power to set aside domestic 
laws in contrast with the ECHR, since the alleged incompatibility between these 
two sources of legislation amounts to a question of constitutionality falling under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Corte Costituzionale (Decisions Nos. 348, para. 
3.3, and 349, para. 6.1, of 2007). Moreover, in the Decision No. 39 of 2008,48 the 
Corte Costituzionale indirectly confirmed that also with reference to pre-existing 
rules it will be necessary to wait for its decision in order to repeal the provision in 
contrast with the ECHR. Any antinomy between domestic and international law 
must, in any case, be resolved by the Court, even when it can be maintained that 
the ECHR provisions, within the meaning arising from a constant case law of the 
Strasburg Court, can be immediately applied by the national court given their pre-
cise, unconditional and complete character.
47 See Corte Costituzionale, 26 November 2009, No. 311, para. 6. A reference to the criterion 
of consistent interpretation in order to guarantee the application of domestic law compatible with 
international treaty law is contained also in Decision No. 349 of 2007, cit. supra note 46, para. 
6.2, and Decision No. 239 of 24 July 2009, para. 3.
48 See Corte Costituzionale, B.R. v. Provincia di Reggio Emilia et al., 27 February 2008, No. 
39, IYIL, Vol. XVIII, 2008, p. 360 ff. (commentary by nApoletAno).
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The Corte Costituzionale does not deal with the question of unconstitutional-
ity in light of the principle of the temporal succession of laws.49 It must be not-
ed that the ECHR shall apply, at least with reference to its self-executing rules, 
therefore determining the repealing of pre-existing domestic laws in contrast with 
it. Regardless of any other argument on the supremacy of international obliga-
tions even on subsequent laws, one can maintain that if a domestic court identi-
fies a conflict between the ECHR and a pre-existing national law that cannot be 
solved by way of interpretation, it will simply disapply the latter as it violates the 
European Convention, whose provisions must be reconstructed taking into account 
the ECtHR case law.
The Corte Costituzionale, however, does not seem to share this opinion, rather 
reaffirming and extending the effects of Article 117(1) of the Italian Constitution on 
the existing domestic law prior to the entry into force of the ECHR. In the Court’s 
view, Article 117(1), on one hand, attributes a particular “force of resistance” to 
domestic laws implementing international treaties, such as the ECHR, in case of 
conflict with ordinary legislation. On the other hand, it brings international treaties 
under the jurisdiction of the Corte Costituzionale, since “eventual conflicts will 
not generate problems of the temporal succession of laws or assessments of the 
respective hierarchical arrangement of the provisions in contrast, but questions of 
constitutionality” (Decision No. 348 of 2007, para. 4.3).
It is a reason of concern that the Court does not allow domestic courts to set 
aside, while interpreting a rule, pre-existing provisions of national law incompat-
ible with specific obligations of international law.50 It would be desirable that the 
Court change this position. Indeed, the issue not only relates to cases of conflict be-
tween a national provision entered into force before the ECHR and the Convention 
itself, but also to all other international treaties of “great significance” ratified more 
recently by Italy, including the new Protocols to the Convention.
49 See, on this point, mAStroiAnni, “Anche le leggi precedenti la Convenzione europea dei 
diritti dell’uomo debbono essere rimosse dalla Corte costituzionale?”, RDI, 2008, p. 456 ff.
50 In its referral order that led the Corte Costituzionale to pass the Decision No. 39, the 
Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (Regional Administrative Tribunal) of Emilia Romagna 
held that, although the ECHR is binding on Italy, the enforcement of human rights under the 
Convention concerns national legislation and the Convention rules are not directly applicable in 
the domestic legal system. The TAR implicitly denied any possibility of automatic abrogation or 
non-application by a court of domestic laws in conflict with the ECHR, as the power of repealing 
a law in contrast with international obligations is an exclusive competence of the national and 
regional legislator, as well as of the Corte Costituzionale, when ruling on questions of constitu-
tionality, especially with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution. It is a matter of concern 
that the Corte Costituzionale did not censure the TAR’s anachronistic point of view, even when 
the latter denied the direct applicability of the ECHR and stated that the European Convention 
creates only inter-governmental obligations that do not confer any power to national courts to 
set aside domestic laws, also in the case they have been superseded by subsequent international 
treaty provisions. See Conforti, “Atteggiamenti preoccupanti della giurisprudenza italiana sui 
rapporti fra diritto interno e trattati internazionali”, DUDI, 2008, p. 581 ff.
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Another interesting aspect that must be pointed out concerns the competence 
of domestic courts to raise a question of constitutionality with reference to Article 
10 of the Constitution, in the case the ECHR rule coincides with a generally rec-
ognized rule of international law. According to some scholars, the Court wants to 
reaffirm explicitly the automatic incorporation into the Italian legal system of the 
rules of the European Convention that, though codified in an international treaty, 
reproduce international customary law.51
Moreover, another element can be taken into consideration in order to un-
derstand why the Court specifies a twofold parameter, Articles 117 and 10 of the 
Constitution, for challenging the constitutionality of a domestic law. While affirm-
ing that the domestic court is “barred from disputing the interpretation of the ECHR 
given by the Strasbourg Court”, the Corte Costituzionale reserves the competence 
to verify whether “the ECHR rule, as construed by the European Court, […] is in 
conflict with the other relevant rules of the […] [Italian] Constitution”.52 In this 
case, the review of the Court cannot be “limited to the possible infringement of the 
principles and fundamental rights of the Constitution, but must be extended to con-
flicts between the ‘intermediate rules’ and the Constitution”.53 So, the Constitutional 
Court maintains that ECHR provisions, as interpreted by the ECtHR, can be ap-
plied only if they are consistent with the Constitution. This is an important specifi-
cation, considering that in the case law prior to the 2001 constitutional reform the 
Court had stated that “in the absence of a specific constitutional basis”, when the 
rules of international treaty law are implemented into the domestic legal system 
by an ordinary law, “the constitutional limit operates in its entirety, as it happens 
with respect to any other [domestic] law”.54 As mentioned above, the European 
Convention was, in fact, ratified and implemented by Italy by an ordinary law and 
the Corte Costituzionale has excluded, as a general rule, that the ECHR falls within 
the field of application of Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution (Decisions Nos. 
348 and 349 of 2007).
Therefore, in case of conflict with the Italian Constitution, the effectiveness of 
the mechanism of “mobile reference” to international law as provided for in Article 
117(1) would be excluded and, as a consequence, the ECHR rule could not account 
for a parameter of constitutionality for reviewing domestic laws (Decision No. 311 
of 2009, para. 6). On the contrary, if a ECHR rule coincides with a rule of interna-
tional customary law, the reference to Article 10(1) of the Constitution narrows the 
competence of the Constitutional Court only to verify whether that ECHR rule is in 
conflict with the “fundamental principles of the constitutional legal order” and the 
“inalienable human rights”, and not with all the relevant rules of the Constitution. 
51 See teSAuro, cit. supra note 46, p. 214.
52 See Corte Costituzionale, No. 311 of 2009, cit. supra note 47, para. 6.
53 See Corte Costituzionale, No. 348 of 2007, cit. supra note 46, para. 4.7, and No. 349 of 
2007, cit. supra note 46, para. 6.2.
54 See Corte Costituzionale, 23 March 2001, No. 73, para. 3.1.
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This case law leads potentially to a two-tier constitutional status of the human 
rights protected by the ECHR.
One can assume that the Court takes into account the aforementioned distinc-
tion when it contemplates, as an exceptional hypothesis, the possibility of challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Italian law implementing the European Convention, 
and declaring the unconstitutionality of the part of this law which incorporates the 
ECHR rules in conflict with the Constitution. The same distinction is also impor-
tant when considering the consequences deriving from another aspect pointed out 
by the Court. The Corte Costituzionale held that, in order to increase the standard 
of protection of any human right in the domestic legal system, the application of 
the ECHR, as construed by the ECtHR, needs to be balanced with “the other in-
terests guaranteed by the Constitution, i.e. the other constitutional rules protecting 
fundamental rights that could be affected by the extension” of the protection of 
the right concerned (Decision No. 317 of 2009, para. 7).55 In conclusion, whereas 
the reference parameter is Article 10(1) Constitution, the competence of the Corte 
Costituzionale should be confined to the verification of the compatibility of the 
ECHR rule with respect to the “fundamental principles of the constitutional legal 
order” (the so called “supreme values of the Constitution”); as such, no balance 
test between the standard of protection deriving from the ECHR and other interests 
guaranteed by the Constitution should be carried out.
According to the Constitutional Court case law, “the common judge […] can-
not apply a ECHR rule (at present, differently from a rule of EC [now EU] law that 
has direct effect) instead of the conflicting domestic one, and cannot even less ap-
ply a rule of domestic law that he deems in conflict with the ECHR, and therefore 
with the Constitution” (see Decision No. 311 of 2009, para. 6). In other words, the 
Convention does not produce effects in the domestic legal order capable of estab-
lishing the jurisdiction of national courts to apply directly its provisions in disputes 
pending before them,56 and to avoid at the same time the application of the relevant 
55 See also Corte Costituzionale, 4 December 2009, No. 317, IYIL, Vol. XIX, 2009, p. 437 
ff. (commentary by pAlomBino).
56 From the incorporation of the ECHR till the 1980s, Italian courts have given a number of 
decisions concerning the status of the Convention in Italian domestic legal order. These decisions 
have never recognized that the ECHR has a constitutional status nor that the Convention ranks 
midway between the Constitution and ordinary laws, that is to say whether it prevails even over 
laws enacted after the Convention was ratified by Italy. In 1988, in the Polo Castro case (8 May 
1989, No. 15, IYIL, Vol. VIII, 1988-1992, p. 126 ff.) the Corte di Cassazione held that “the provi-
sions of the ECHR, with the only exception of those worded in a very imprecise and generic way 
as to sustain an individual claim, are immediately applicable within the domestic legal order”, 
recognizing the direct applicability of the ECHR rules that contained “the model of a national act 
complete in its essential elements”. In 2002, in the Muscas case (19 July 2002, No. 10542, IYIL, 
Vol. XIII, 2003, p. 235 ff., commentary by Bruno) the Corte di Cassazione maintained that any 
direct application of the provisions of the Convention “is the responsibility of the national judge 
who, if perceives any conflict with the national law, must give precedence to the conventional 
rule provided with immediate binding effect in respect of the concrete case, even if this means 
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conflicting domestic law. Moreover, the Court has held the thesis that, differently 
from what happens with a rule of EU law that has “direct effect”, the domestic court 
is barred from applying directly the ECHR rules in place of rules of domestic law 
inconsistent with the European Convention. In Decisions Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007 
(and also in its subsequent decisions) the Court has never missed the opportunity to 
reaffirm the difference between the EU law rules having direct effect and the rules 
of the European Convention whose “direct effect” is denied. From this perspective, 
considering that Article 117(1) of the Constitution (that provides the obligation of 
fulfilling international obligations) is not sufficient to recognize to the ECHR the 
same status as the EU law,57 it is difficult to envisage what could instigate a shift 
towards the recognition of “direct effect” to the ECHR rules.
It is hard to share the opinion of the Court, insofar as it leads to apply widely 
the notion of direct effect in order to rule out the direct applicability of the ECHR 
provisions. Indeed, the direct applicability and the direct effect of an international 
treaty rule cannot be limited to some treaties, such as the EU Treaties, and ruled 
out as to others, such as the ECHR, nor can it be excluded for treaties in general 
regardless of the specificity of the provisions therein. The circumstance that an in-
ternational provision does not require any implementing legislation within Member 
States or that an international obligation imposed upon States by a treaty is directly 
enforceable by individuals before their domestic courts is a question that should 
be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the clear, precise and 
unconditional character of the international rule, as well as the object and purpose 
of the treaty.
A possible solution to the question of the effects of the European Convention 
in the Italian system could be found by setting aside the comparison – incisively 
outlined by the Corte Costituzionale in the Decisions Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007 – 
between the ECHR system and the “supranational” EU system. In particular, this 
would require to abandon the expression “direct effect” and to use the concept of 
self-execution when analyzing and determining the effects of the rules deriving 
from treaties different from those establishing the EU. It is well-known that the 
EU legal system is different from any other legal system based on an international 
treaty. As a consequence, a comparison between the EU and the ECHR systems 
(or a system deriving from any other international treaty) would inevitably lead 
to deny the “direct effect” of the rules deriving from the latter. As pointed out by 
some scholars, 
“[i]n principle, substantive provisions of the ECHR are self-execut-
ing. Rather, by saying that the ECHR does not have direct effect, the 
the non-application of the national rule”. The same conclusion was confirmed by the Corte di 
Cassazione in the case Centurione Scotto v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (23 December 
2005, No. 28507, IYIL, Vol. XVI, 2006, p. 314 ff., commentary by Bruno).
57 See CAtAldi, cit. supra note 46, p. 294.
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Court seems to rule out a particular effect, specifically the setting 
aside of inconsistent national law. This is precisely the meaning of the 
term ‘direct effect’ within the conceptual framework of EU law […] 
Thus, […] the Constitutional Court seems to allude (inadvertently) 
to the very thin conceptual line which separates the notion of direct 
effect from that of self-execution”.58
Considering the present constitutional structure and without any particular 
hermeneutic effort, it would be easier to find a solution to the question of the impact 
of the ECHR on the Italian legal system, if the Court started to consider the appli-
cability of the European Convention provisions in light of their complete character 
and their immediately preceptive nature. In its Decision No. 311 of 2009, the Corte 
Costituzionale partially went in this direction by stating: “the domestic judge, as 
the common judge of the Convention, has the duty to apply the relevant rules, as 
interpreted by the Strasburg Court”. Therefore, one can infer that the competence 
of the ordinary courts to apply the ECHR is limited only by the existence of a con-
flict with a domestic law provision and by the impossibility to solve this conflict 
by way of interpretation. Accordingly, the domestic judge should be seen as fully 
competent to apply the ECHR in all cases when he is not bound to raise the plea of 
unconstitutionality before the Corte Costituzionale. If this interpretation is correct, 
the recent case law of the Constitutional Court shows an opening to the direct ap-
plication of the ECHR by the domestic courts and consequently to the possibility 
that an individual can rely directly on the ECHR rights before them,59 at least in all 
cases where the application of the ECHR does not entail the non-application of a 
domestic rule. Domestic courts can apply directly the ECHR rules, as construed by 
the European Court, in order to extend the applicability of a right already protected 
at national level to more specific cases60 or when there is the need for filling a legal 
loophole in the domestic system.61 This conclusion is not hindered by the need to 
reach the “necessary balance” between the conventional and the domestic protec-
tion of fundamental rights, because the Corte Costituzionale itself entrusts with this 
task also the lower courts (Decision No. 317 of 2009, para. 7).
58 See CAnnizzAro, “The Effect of the ECHR on the Italian Legal Order: Direct Effect and 
Supremacy”, IYIL, Vol. XIX, 2009, p. 173 ff., p. 177. On this point, see nollKAemper, “The 
Effect of the ECHR and the Judgments of the ECtHR on National Law – Comments on the Paper 
of Enzo Cannizzaro”, ibid., p. 89 ff., who argues “that there exists quite and essential distinc-
tion between direct effect and supremacy [...] The combination of direct effect and supremacy is 
unique in European law, and is there where the real power of direct effect lies. But direct effect 
certainly is not limited to this, and judicial practice shows many examples where courts could 
give direct effect without a question of supremacy arising” (p. 193).
59 See teSAuro, cit. supra note 46, p. 217 ff.
60 See, for instance, Corte di Cassazione, Drassich, 11 December 2008, No. 45807.
61 See, for instance, Corte di Cassazione, Dorigo, 25 January 2007, No. 2800, IYIL, Vol. 
XVI, 2006, p. 317 ff. (commentary by pAlomBino).
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However, it must be noted that, even welcoming the specification made by the 
Court, some doubts concerning the definition of the precise status of the European 
Convention within the Italian legal system still exist and do concern the impact of 
the ECHR rules on the Italian law. It cannot be forgotten, in fact, that the ECHR 
accounts for a binding parameter of international law, as per Article 117(1) of the 
Constitution, as well as for a system of protection of fundamental rights already 
provided by the Constitution. As such, the ECHR not only “reaffirms the protec-
tion guaranteed by constitutional provisions, but […] [contributes] to determining 
its perceptive content”.62
1.2.3. Role of the Corte Costituzionale
Concerning the role of the Corte Costituzionale, it has the threefold duty to: 
a) “verify whether a conflict exists and cannot be settled at all through an accept-
able interpretation, including a systematic interpretation, of the rule of domestic 
law in light of the ECHR rule, as construed by the Strasburg Court”; b) “verify 
whether the conflict is determined by a standard of protection provided by the rule 
of domestic law which is lower than the one guaranteed by the ECHR, as Article 
53 of the European Convention itself considers expressly compatible the contrary 
hypothesis”; c) “in case of conflict, […] [declare] the unconstitutionality of the rule 
of domestic law as inconsistent with Article 117(1) of the Constitution with refer-
ence to the relevant ECHR rule”.63
Consequently, considering also the clear reference to Article 53 ECHR, it 
seems that the hypothesis of a challenge to the constitutionality of the Italian law 
implementing the European Convention is not only exceptional, but also unlikely 
to occur. After affirming the subsidiary character of the Convention and denying 
“direct effects” to the ECHR rules, it is almost unnecessary to refer to the consti-
tutional counter-limits. In fact, when a ECHR rule, as construed by the Strasbourg 
Court, limits or jeopardizes fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution, the Corte Costituzionale excludes “the effectiveness of the reference 
to international law and, therefore, the capacity of the latter to integrate the param-
eter set by Article 117(1) of the Constitution”.64 Accordingly, in the Decision No. 
317 of 2009, the Court held that:
“With reference to a fundamental right, the compliance with inter-
national obligations can never determine a lower level of protection 
compared to the standard already existing in the domestic legal sys-
62 See CAnnizzAro, “Gerarchia e competenza nei rapporti fra trattati e leggi interne”, RDI, 
1993, p. 351 ff., p. 369.
63 See Corte Costituzionale, No. 311 of 2009, cit. supra note 47, para. 6.
64 Ibid.
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tem but, vice versa, it can and must amount to an effective instru-
ment to extend the protection itself. […] Besides, Article 53 of the 
European Convention requires that the interpretation of the ECHR 
provisions cannot lead to a level of protection which is lower than the 
one guaranteed by domestic sources. […] It is clear that this Court 
cannot accept that, through Article 117(1) of the Italian Constitution, 
a level of protection lower than the one established in the domestic 
system is guaranteed; likewise, it cannot admit that a higher level 
of protection, that could be introduced in the same way, is denied 
to an individual entitled to a fundamental right. The consequence of 
this reasoning is that the comparison between conventional and con-
stitutional protection of fundamental rights must be made aiming at 
the maximum possible extension of guarantees, also developing the 
potential of the constitutional rules concerning the same rights. […] 
The overall result of the integration of national guarantees must have 
a plus sign, in the sense that the impact of a single ECHR rule on the 
Italian law must generate a higher standard for the entire fundamental 
rights protection system” (para. 7).
In conclusion, considering the subsidiary character of the protection system 
established by the ECHR, both the Corte Costituzionale and the domestic courts 
should not be bound to apply those ECHR rules that, according to the interpreta-
tion of the Strasburg Court, determine a violation of the standard of protection 
guaranteed by the Italian legal system. This would be true even affirming the self-
executing character of the rules of the European Convention, whose application 
would anyway be conditioned by its compliance with the Constitution. As argued 
by some scholars,
“the non-application by the courts of national laws that are incompat-
ible with the ECHR (with the contextual direct application of the con-
ventional rule as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court) can undoubt-
edly coexist with the Constitutional Court’s review, which should be 
called upon in particular cases where the inconsistency between the 
domestic rule and the ECHR rule amounts to a ‘systemic violation’ 
of the Convention”,
i.e. a persistent and reiterated violation caused by structural or general defi-
ciencies in the national law or practice.65 The same could be true where a domestic 
court has no possibility to interpret national law consistently with the ECHR, but 
65 See CAtAldi, cit. supra note 12, p. 573; id., cit. supra note 46, p. 301.
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the domestic provision needs to be repealed by the Constitutional Court in order to 
abide by a final decision of the Strasbourg Court.66
1.2.4. Status and effects of the ECHR after the Accession of the EU
After the abovementioned decisions of the Constitutional Court, Italian admin-
istrative courts again dealt with the question of the direct applicability of the ECHR 
rules. The Consiglio di Stato, in its Decision of 2 March 2010, No. 1220, held that 
the ECHR rules have become “directly applicable” in the national legal system as a 
consequence of the modification of Article 6 TEU following the coming into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. Similarly, the Administrative Regional Tribunal (TAR) of 
Lazio, in its Decision of 18 May 2010, No. 11984, affirmed that, as the EU Treaty 
provides the accession of the European Union to the ECHR (Article 6 TEU), “the 
acknowledgement of the fundamental rights set by the ECHR as principles inher-
ent in Union law has immediate consequences of the utmost importance, as the 
Convention rules become immediately effective in the national legal systems of 
member States, through EU law, and therefore in Italy according to Article 11 of 
the Constitution”.67
However, looking at the decisions of the administrative courts, it is not clear 
the reasoning that led to the acknowledgement of the “immediate effectiveness” 
or the “direct applicability” of the Convention rules in the national legal system 
on the basis of the new wording of Article 6 TEU. In other words, it is not clear 
whether the administrative courts draw the direct applicability of the Convention 
rules from Article 6(2) TEU (“The Union shall accede to the ECHR”) or Article 
6(3) TEU (“Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law”). Therefore, the thesis maintained by admin-
istrative courts that the ECHR direct effects in Italy can derive from UE law does 
not seem persuasive. On one hand, Article 6(3) TEU, reaffirming what was already 
provided in the previous versions of the EU Treaty, does not appear able to give 
direct effect to the ECHR rules into the national legal system. On the other hand, 
the EU accession to the Convention will not be able to guarantee, on the basis of 
Article 11 of the Constitution, the national courts the possibility to apply directly 
the ECHR rules setting aside the inconsistent national laws.
Recently, in its Decision of 15 September 2010, No. 5988, the TAR of 
Lombardia tackled the same questions already dealt with by the Consiglio di Stato 
and the TAR Lazio in the abovementioned decisions, adopting a more correct ap-
66 See Corte Costituzionale, 4 April 2011, No. 113. Concerning the effects of judgments and 
of the case law of the ECtHR on national legal orders, see infra section 2.
67 See terrASi, “Il giudice amministrativo e l’applicabilità diretta della CEDU all’indomani 
dell’entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona”, DUDI, 2010, p. 682 ff.
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proach. Maintaining in any case that it is premature to deal with the consequences 
of the future accession of the EU to the ECHR with reference to the direct applica-
bility of the Convention rules, the TAR held that:
“By the accession to the ECHR, the Convention will take, on the 
contrary, the same position as international treaties in the system of 
the sources of EU law so that, once entered in the national legal sys-
tem through the EU law, it will acquire all the characteristics typical 
of the EU law in terms of primacy, direct effect, possibility for the 
court to disapply the national law inconsistent with it (with the risk 
of having regime for those ECHR rights not introduced by EU law)” 
(para. 5.1.).
More recently, this approach was confirmed by the Corte Costituzionale in its 
Decision of 11 March 2011, No. 80. The Court held, indeed, firstly that new para-
graphs 1 and 3 of Article 6 TEU cannot be interpreted as recognizing direct effect 
to the rules of the ECHR in the Italian legal system and as authorizing the domestic 
court to disapply national laws inconsistent with them. Secondly, any reasoning 
supporting the direct effect of the ECHR rules cannot actually be grounded on 
Article 6(2) TEU, considering that an accurate definition of the effects of this provi-
sion will depend on the conditions and modalities set out in the Agreement on the 
Accession of the EU to the European Convention (para. 5.3).
2. effeCtS of judgmentS And CASe lAw of the eCthr on nAtionAl legAl 
SyStemS
2.1. Obligations Arising from Article 46(1) ECHR as Interpreted by the ECtHR
The European Convention envisages that final judgments of the ECtHR shall 
be binding on the parties to the proceedings. In Article 46(1) ECHR the Contracting 
States have provided that, in all legal disputes to which they are party, they will 
comply with the final judgments of the ECtHR. It follows from this article that the 
judgments of the ECtHR have only inter partes effects. However, this provision 
does not specify the content of such obligation, leaving the door open to interpreta-
tion.
2.1.1. Binding Effects of Final Judgments against Respondent States
As is well known, every final judgment of the ECtHR has the effect of res judi-
cata for the respondent State. However, this judgment is essentially declaratory and 
leaves to the State the choice of the means for complying with its obligation under 
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Article 46(1).68 Indeed, the ECtHR does not possess the authority to invalidate na-
tional norms or to revise final decisions of national courts judged to be inconsistent 
with the European Convention; rather, “states must work backwards from the vio-
lation to understand what must be changed to remedy the violation in the specific 
case and to avoid what future cases might also arise”.69
The obligation of the respondent State to give effect to the judgment of the 
ECtHR must be complied with through measures appropriate to the particular case 
(restitutio in integrum, if the nature of the breach allows it, or just satisfaction).70 
However, if at the origin of the violation there is a legal provision or a practice, 
the adoption of measures of a general nature is needed in order to prevent future 
violations. In its recent practice, the ECtHR tends to limit the freedom of the State 
in selecting suitable measures, indicating which individual measures or general 
measures to be taken in order to give effect to its judgment.71 
The binding effects of the final judgments of the ECtHR are addressed to all the 
bodies of the respondent State. However, a legislative measure might be required 
in order to remedy a structural deficiency in the national system. In case of default 
of legislative power, the domestic judge may find himself also assuming functions 
that may be defined as “legislative substitution”, in cases in which the national 
system does not allow for review of a final judgment in a proceeding recognized 
by the ECtHR as being inconsistent with the European Convention.72 On specific 
68 ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, Application No. 6833/74, Judgment of 13 June 1979, para. 58. 
See also hunt, “State Obligations Following from a Judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights”, in ChriStou and rAymond (eds.), European Court of Human Rights: Remedies and 
Execution of Judgments, London, 2005, p. 25 ff.
69 hAwKinS and jACoBy, “Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-
American Court for Human Rights”, p. 20, available at: <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p278931_index.html>.
70 See, e.g., ECtHR, Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Article 50), Application No. 
14556/89, Judgment of 31 October 1995, para. 34.
71 See, e.g., ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, Application No. 31443/96, Judgment of 22 June 
2004. The Court summarised its interpretation of Article 46 by holding that it included the ob-
ligation: “[N]ot just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under 
Article 41, but also to select, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general 
and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an 
end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. Subject to 
monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, the respondent State remains free to choose the means 
by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that 
such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment” (para. 192).
72 See in the Italian legal order Corte di Cassazione, Somogyi, 3 October 2006, No. 32678 
(IYIL, Vol. XVI, 2006, p. 317 ff., commentary by pAlomBino); Corte di Cassazione, Dorigo, cit. 
supra note 61. Recently, the Corte Costituzionale (Decision No. 113 of 2011, cit. supra note 66) 
declared the constitutional inconsistency of Article 630 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inso-
far as it failed to provide the reopening of domestic criminal proceedings, where it was necessary, 
pursuant to Article 46(1) ECHR, to comply with a final ruling of the ECtHR. The majority of 
the Contracting States allow for criminal proceedings to be reopened following judgments of the 
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occasions, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has expressly in-
dicated the national courts as bodies called upon to execute the determinations of 
the Court.73 This action of domestic judges does not exempt, of course, the na-
tional legislature from the obligation of adapting the domestic legal system to the 
European Convention, but it has the merit of preventing further violations.
Finally, the new Protocol No. 14 gives to Contracting States the power to ask 
the Committee of Ministers to refer to a problem of interpretation of a final judg-
ment to the ECtHR, under Article 46(2) ECHR, before a national court decides on 
the effect of this final judgment on the domestic law.74
Several Member States of the Council of Europe have set up national institu-
tions entrusted with the task of monitoring compliance with the obligations flowing 
from the European Convention, including decisions of the ECtHR. Particularly, 
six parliaments – those of Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine and the 
United Kingdom – set up a special body for supervising the implementation of 
judgments.75 Perhaps the most notable of these is the UK Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, which is generally regarded as a model for other 
countries to follow. Established in 2001, the Joint Committee is empowered to 
analyse all government bills and, where it considers that a provision can be im-
proved to better guarantee compatibility with the European Convention, it makes 
ECtHR, and a smaller number also allow for the reopening of civil proceedings. The Committee 
of Ministers has recommended, in its Recommendation on the re-examination or reopening of 
certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the ECtHR, that Member States should 
“examine their national legal systems with a view to ensuring that there exist adequate possibili-
ties of re-examination of the case, including reopening of proceedings, in instances where the 
Court has found a violation of the Convention”.
73 See, i.e Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 5 July 2005, ResDH (2005)56, concerning the right to an effective remedy against monitoring 
of prisoners’ correspondence and other restrictions imposed on prisoners’ rights – general meas-
ures in the cases of Messina (No. 2) (Application No. 25498/94, Judgment of 28 September 2000, 
final on 28 December 2000), Ganci (Application No. 41576/98, Judgment of 30 October 2003, 
final on 30 January 2004), and Bifulco (Application No. 60915/00, Judgment of 8 February 2005, 
final on 8 May 2005) against Italy. The Committee specifically addressed Italian authorities with 
reference to the ECtHR’s decisions that ascertained a violation of the right of correspondence 
(Article 8 of the Convention), inviting them to promptly adopt “the legislative and other meas-
ures necessary to ensure prompt and effective judicial review of decisions ordering derogations 
from the ordinary prison regime or ordering restrictions on prisoners’ right to correspondence” 
and encouraging the domestic courts in particular “to grant direct effect to the European Court’s 
judgments so as to prevent new violations of the Convention, thus contributing to fulfilling Italy’s 
obligations under Article 46 of the Convention”.
74 A referral decision requires a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to 
sit on the Committee.
75 See drzemCzewSKi, “The Parliamentary Assembly’s Involvement in the Supervision 
of the Judgments of the Strasbourg Court”, NQHR, 2010, p. 7 ff. In addition, only 12 of 47 
States have procedures in place to inform national parliamentarians of adverse judgments by 
the ECtHR: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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recommendations that the legislation be remedied to “make the relevant human 
rights standard explicit”. It also reviews the government’s response to an adverse 
judgment of the ECtHR. As part of its work, the Committee may also adopt reme-
dial orders, which are a form of delegated legislation amending primary legislation 
following a declaration by a UK court that the primary legislation is incompatible 
with the European Convention or a Strasbourg judgment in a case concerning the 
United Kingdom.
In practice, a systematic refusal by Contracting States to implement judgments 
of the ECtHR is rare. The majority of Contracting States try to act in compliance 
with the European Convention and the judgments of the ECtHR, although it should 
be noted that some countries have particular difficulty in complying with some 
judgments against them.76
2.1.2. Expanding the Scope of Article 46(1) ECHR: Effects of Pilot Judgments
There is no provision in the European Convention which expressly refers to 
the pilot judgment procedure (PJP).77 However, in order to facilitate effective im-
plementation of the European Convention by respondent States, the ECtHR has 
adopted a PJP which allows the Court to clearly identify, in its judgments, the 
existence of structural problems underlying the violation of the Convention rights 
concerned, and to indicate specific measures or actions to be taken by respondent 
States to remedy them.78 
The main aim of this procedure is not only to remove the consequences of the 
unlawful national act for the applicant, but also to induce the respondent State to 
resolve a large number of individual cases arising from the same structural problem 
at the domestic level, and thus to offer guarantees of non-repetition.79 
76 Recently, for example, in the Resolution 1787 (2011) Implementation of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe point-
ed at Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Romania, The Russia Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Poland as the countries in which structural problems in implementation of ECHR have arisen. In 
these States the ECtHR repetitively finds violations of the European Convention in similar cases. 
In the opinion of the Parliamentary Assembly such a situation seriously undermines the rule of 
law in the states concerned.
77 Recently, the PJP has been codified in the new Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
ECtHR, which entered into force on 31 March 2011.
78 See Broniowski, cit. supra note 71, paras. 189-194 and the operative part; and, Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland [GC], Application No. 35014/97, Judgment of 19 June 2006, paras. 231-239 
and the operative part.
79 On this point, see, among others, ColAndreA, “On the Power of the European Court 
of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-Monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the 
Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases”, Human Rights Law Review, 2007, p. 396 ff.
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While the respondent State’s action is aimed at the resolution of such a dysfunc-
tion, the ECtHR may decide to adjourn examination of all similar cases.80 However, 
the ECtHR has held that if the respondent State fails to adopt the measures indicat-
ed in the pilot judgment and continues to violate the Convention, the Court would 
have no choice but to resume examination of all similar pending applications and 
to take them to judgment so as to ensure effective observance of the Convention 
rights.81
Since the PJP was introduced, the ECtHR has appeared to be increasingly will-
ing to identify systemic problems and to provide guidance to the respondent States, 
also demanding the introduction of specific remedial measures82 and setting dead-
lines for compliance with the Court’s judgments.83 
In light of this innovative procedure, some scholars emphasize that the PJP is 
used by the ECtHR as an instrument imposing a “programmed lawmaking obliga-
tion” on the domestic legislature, “which is able to substitute the lack […] of direct 
effect of the Convention and the lack of erga omnes effect of the Court’s judgments 
in the domestic legal system”.84
In the ECtHR’s view, the binding effects of a pilot judgment are based on Article 
46 ECHR.85 The choice of this legal basis has been criticised,86 although political 
80 See, i.e. Broniowski, cit. supra note 71, para. 198.
81 See, i.e. Burdov v. Russia No.2, Application No. 33509/04, Judgment of 15 January 2009, 
para. 128, and, Olaru and others v. Moldova, Applications Nos. 476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08 and 
13136/07, Judgment of 28 July 2009, para. 52.
82 See, i.e. ECtHR, Suljagic v. Bosnia Herzegovina, Application No. 27912/02, Judgment of 
3 November 2009, para. 64.
83 See, i.e. ECtHR, Burdov cit. supra note 81, para. 141.
84 See, in particular, fyrnyS, “Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot 
Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights”, German Law Journal, 2011, p. 
1231 ff., p. 1233.
85 See, i.e. Broniowski, cit. supra note 71, para. 193: “Although it is in principle not for 
the Court to determine what remedial measures may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent 
State’s obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, in view of the systemic situation which it 
has identified, the Court would observe that general measures at national level are undoubtedly 
called for in execution of the present judgment, measures which must take into account the many 
people affected. Above all, the measures adopted must be such as to remedy the systemic defect 
underlying the Court’s finding of a violation so as not to overburden the Convention system with 
large numbers of applications deriving from the same cause. Such measures should therefore 
include a scheme which offers to those affected redress for the Convention violation identified in 
the instant judgment in relation to the present applicant. In this context the Court’s concern is to 
facilitate the most speedy and effective resolution of a dysfunction established in national human 
rights protection. Once such a defect has been identified, it falls to the national authorities, under 
the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to take, retroactively if appropriate […], the nec-
essary remedial measures in accordance with the subsidiary character of the Convention, so that 
the Court does not have to repeat its finding in a lengthy series of comparable cases”.
86 Criticism regarding the legal basis of the procedure was raised by some ECtHR judges (see 
Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Zagrebelsky in Hutten-Czapska, cit. supra note 78) and by at 
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statements such as the Interlaken Declaration make clear that the procedure has 
now been accepted, welcomed and encouraged by all Contracting States.87
It must be emphasized that the binding effects of pilot judgments are not influ-
enced by whether the indications for State action are included in the merits of the 
judgment only or also in its operative provisions. Of course, inclusion in the opera-
tive provisions increases the legal authority of the judgment. Similarly, the binding 
effects of pilot judgments are not influenced by whether they are rendered by the 
Grand Chamber or not. A pilot judgment delivered by a Grand Chamber only has a 
wider persuasive effect. 
Finally, an argument in support of the binding effect of pilot judgments may be 
drawn from the consideration that a number of PJPs share an a priori recognition 
by higher courts of respondent States that the existing domestic law or practice 
concerned violates the European Convention, and that domestic authorities have 
failed to respond satisfactorily to such findings.88 Nevertheless, practice shows that 
the whole PJP depends to a large extent on the respondent State’s willingness to co-
operate. The cases Broniowksi and Hutten-Czapska showed how different a State’s 
attitude could be in this respect. Whereas in Broniowski the Polish Government was 
fully willing to cooperate, in Hutten-Czapska the same State contested that a pilot 
procedure should be used at all.
The ECtHR has held that a respondent State may also adopt remedial meas-
ures that are not retroactive. The case Sejdovic v. Italy89 is particularly interesting 
pointing this respect. Indeed, in a first stage before a Chamber, the ECtHR found 
a violation of the right to a fair trial in the context of in absentia convictions and, 
in the operative part of the judgment, it established that this violation originated 
in systemic problems in Italian criminal law and practice. As a result, the ECtHR 
ordered that Italy should take general measures, going beyond the facts of the par-
ticular case. Following this judgment, the respondent State adopted legal reforms 
in order to comply with the judgment of the Court. However, the new laws did not 
have retroactive effect on the case of Mr. Sejdovic. In a second stage before the 
Grand Chamber, although acknowledging the systemic nature of the problem, the 
ECtHR did not call for general measures, but only noted the reforms adopted by the 
respondent State and, in the operative part of the judgment, limited itself to finding 
a violation in the specific case.90 
least one Government (see ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], Application No. 56581/00, Judgment 
of 1 March 2006, para. 115), regarding the legal basis of the procedure.
87 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken 
Declaration, 19 February 2010, Action Plan, lett. D.
88 See i.e. ECtHR, Broniowski (cit. supra note 71), Lukenda v. Slovenia (Application No. 
23032/02, Judgment of 6 October 2005), Hutten-Czapska (cit. supra note 78), Scordino v. Italy 
(No. 1) [GC] (Application No. 36813/97, Judgment of 29 March 2006) and Burdov (No. 2) (cit. 
supra note 83).
89 ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy, Application No. 56581/00, Judgment of 10 November 2004.
90 Ibid.
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The Sejdovic case seems to show the importance that the ECtHR attaches to 
the observance of the non-repetition obligation included in the pilot judgment. 
However, when the domestic legal reforms implementing the remedial measures 
do not have retroactive effect, the resumption by the ECtHR of all similar applica-
tions pending before it is inevitable.
2.2. Binding Effects of ECtHR’s Interim Measures 
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the ECtHR has the power to issue in-
terim measures.91 As is well known, in the leading case of Mamatkulov92 a Grand 
Chamber ruled on the scope of these interim measures and identified the conse-
quences of a respondent State’s failure to respect an order of the ECtHR. In par-
ticular, the ECtHR stated that “under the Convention system, interim measures […] 
play a vital role in avoiding irreversible situations that would prevent the Court 
from properly examining the application and, where appropriate, securing to the 
applicant the practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights asserted”.93 
In these conditions, a failure by a respondent State to comply with interim meas-
ures undermines the effectiveness of the right of individual application guaranteed 
by Article 34 and the State’s formal undertaking in Article 1 to protect the rights 
and freedoms set forth in the European Convention. In addition, in the Olaechea 
Cahuas case,94 the ECtHR clearly considered that a State non-compliance with an 
interim measure will automatically lead to a violation of Article 34 ECHR, irre-
spective of the subsequent finding of a violation of other material provisions of the 
Convention by the ECtHR.95 
91 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court empowers a Chamber or, where appropriate, its President, 
to indicate interim measures. Although the ECtHR receives an increasing number of requests 
for interim measures, in practice these measures have been indicated only in limited spheres, 
when there is an imminent risk of irreparable damage for people. The vast majority of cases 
in which interim measures have been indicated concern deportation, expulsion and extradition 
proceedings. On this point, see Statement Issued by the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights concerning Requests for Interim Measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court), avail-
able at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B76DC4F5-5A09-472B-802C-07B4150BF36D/ 
0/20110211_ART_39_Statement_EN.pdf>. See also SACCuCCi, Le misure provvisorie nella pro-
tezione internazionale dei diritti umani, Torino, 2006.
92 ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], Applications No. 46827/99 and 
46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005.
93 Ibid., para. 125.
94 ECtHR, Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Application No. 24668/03, Judgment of 10 August 
2006.
95 In Paladi v. Moldova (Application No. 39806/05, Judgment of 10 March 2009), the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR stated: “It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate to the Court 
that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective 
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The obligation under Article 34 should be strictly and consistently applied. In 
particular, it requires that the respondent State refrains from taking actions in viola-
tion of the interim measure and takes all steps available to comply with the order. A 
Contracting State cannot substitute its own evaluation for that of the ECtHR in decid-
ing whether or to what extent to comply with interim measures.96 The ECtHR said:
“Indications of interim measures […] permit it not only to carry out 
an effective examination of the application but also to ensure that the 
protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is effective; 
such indications also subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers 
to supervise execution of the final judgment. Such measures thus en-
able the State concerned to discharge its obligation to comply with 
the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of 
Article 46 of the Convention”.97
However, Contracting States are reluctant to recognize such binding effects 
to the decisions on interim measures. On quite a number of recent occasions, the 
ECtHR has been confronted with cases in which States refused to comply with 
these interim measures. For example, in the United Kingdom, scholars assert that 
Section 2(1) of the United Kingdom’s 1998 Human Rights Act on domestic judges’ 
obligation to take into account the Strasburg decisions does not apply to interim 
measures98 and, in the Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case, the UK Government stated 
“the Government policy to comply with Rule 39 measures indicated by the Court 
as a matter of course where it is able to do so”.99 Thus, for some Contracting States 
compliance with interim measures may be considered as a matter of policy and not 
as the fulfilment of a legal obligation. For other States, interim measures have bind-
ing effects for the case to which they are related and, if well motivated, these meas-
ures may be accepted as binding for the domestic authorities as regards other, simi-
lar or identical cases, as a judgment of the Dutch Council of State ascertained.100
impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to 
remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation” (para. 92).
96 As the Grand Chamber hold in Paladi case: “it is clear from the purpose of this rule, which 
is to ensure the effectiveness of the right of individual petition […] that the intentions or reasons 
underlying the acts or omissions in question are of little relevance when assessing whether Article 
34 of the Convention was complied with […] What matters is whether the situation created as a 
result of the authorities’ act or omission conforms to Article 34” (ibid., para. 87).
97 ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, cit. supra note 92, para. 125.
98 BArrett, “The Status and Enforceability of Interim Measures of the European Court of 
Human Rights in English Law: R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi) v. Secretary of State for Defence”, 
Judicial Review, 2009, p. 148 ff.
99 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08, Judgment 
of 2 March 2010, para. 81 (emphasis added).
100 Dutch Council of State (Administrative Law Section), 28 May 2004, available at: <http://
www.raadvanstate.nl> (in Dutch): “Given the general character of the motivation momentarily 
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On the matter of the effects of interim measures of the ECtHR in domestic legal 
orders, a recent ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation is particularly interesting.101 
The Court of Cassation recognized that interim measures of the ECtHR had broad 
effects on the basis of arguments expressed by Strasburg judges in Mamatkulov 
case. In particular, in a case concerning the procedure for expulsion of a Tunisian to 
his country of origin, the Court of Cassation held that the Italian Government – and 
any institution of the Italian Republic – must ensure strict compliance with Article 
3 ECHR. With regard to the risk inherent in the transfer of an individual to Tunisia, 
the Court held that a domestic judge has a duty to identify and adopt alternative 
security measures other than expulsion before ordering the transfer. In addition, the 
Court of Cassation did not declare that interim measures were only binding in this 
specific case; there were binding effects for any other domestic measure of expul-
sion to Tunisia, until it is demonstrated by new facts that individuals expelled in 
that country will not face imminent risks.
The interpretation of the Court of Cassation seems to go beyond what is for-
mally stated by the ECtHR. In particular, the Italian court seems to recognize that 
a decision on interim measures has ultra partes effects whenever other cases have 
factual similarities with the case discussed before the European Court. However, on 
closer inspection, the Italian court did not build ultra partes effects on the decision 
on interim measures, but on the binding force of Article 3 ECHR.102
The solution adopted by the Italian court seems to envisage that the ultra partes 
effects of a decision on interim measures can be recognized only in those cases 
that involved the safeguard of a fundamental value of the Convention, such as the 
absolute prohibition of torture. In other circumstances, however, it appears that 
the Court of Cassation did not grant the binding force of interim measures of the 
ECtHR.
2.3. Effects of the ECtHR’s Case Law
As has been said, the final judgments of the ECtHR only bind the respondent 
State. In other words, they do not have effects erga omnes. However, in Ireland 
v. United Kingdom, the first judgment concerning an inter-State case, the ECtHR 
stated “The Court’s judgments […] serve not only to decide those cases brought 
given for the provisional measure which has been issued – whereby the Section takes into ac-
count that the guarantee meant to be present in case of expulsion to Somalia, is momentarily not 
ensured – it has to be judged that above-mentioned motivated ‘interim measure’ of the President 
is yet to be seen as an obstacle to the expulsion to Northern Somalia of foreigners of Somali 
nationality which belong to a minority and who do not have family or clan bonds in Northern 
Somalia” (unofficial translation).
101 Corte di Cassazione, Decision of 28 April 2010, No. 20514.
102 forlAti, “Misure cautelari adottate dalla Corte europea dei diritti umani e ordinamento 
italiano”, DUDI, 2010, p. 634 ff. 
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before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules 
instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States 
of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties (Article 19)”.103 
In doctrine, a dispute exists on the binding effect of ECtHR case law in re-
spect of its interpretative authority (res interpretata). In other words, it is submit-
ted that the case law of the ECtHR reflects the current state of development of the 
Convention and its Protocols. Some scholars argue that, by failing to take into ac-
count the judgments rendered against other States, in certain cases a State could be 
deemed to be in breach of its duty to fulfil its treaty obligations in good faith.104 The 
interpretative authority of ECtHR’s case law seems primarily asserted by the Court 
itself in decisions on cases struck out of the list because the Court “has already es-
tablished case-law in the matter”105 or “it has specified the nature and scope of the 
obligations undertaken in the matter by the Contracting States” in several previous 
cases.106 On this view, clear and consolidated judgments of the ECtHR would have 
an interpretative authority. 
With the judgment Modinos v. Cyprus, the ECtHR seemed to go further be-
cause firstly it observed that the prohibition of male homosexual conduct in private 
between adults still remains on the Criminal Code of the respondent State and then 
it criticised a decision of the Supreme Court of Cyprus on this matter “notwith-
standing the European Court’s Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom judgment of 22 
October 1981”.107 In this case, the Court referred exclusively to its previous judg-
ment on the matter against another State, establishing that the respondent State had 
violated the Convention.
More recently, in the Interlaken Declaration of 19 February 2010, Contracting 
States are invited to take into account “the Court’s developing case-law, also with 
a view to considering the conclusions to be drawn from a judgment finding a vio-
lation of the Convention by another State, where the same problem of principle 
exists within their own legal system”.108 In light of this, a decision of the ECtHR in 
proceedings against other States Parties may give the States that are not involved 
an occasion to examine their domestic legal systems and to orient themselves in 
103 ECtHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Application. No. 5310/71, Judgment of 18 
January 1978, para. 154.
104 BArKhuySen and vAn emmeriK, “A Comparative View on the Execution of Judgements 
of the European Court of Human Rights”, in ChriStou and rAymond (eds.), European Court of 
Human Rights, Remedies and Execution of Judgements, London, 2005, p. 1 ff.
105 ECtHR, Marlhens v. France, Application No. 22862/93, Judgment of 24 May 1995.
106 ECtHR, Clerc v. France, Application No. 12393/86, Judgment of 26 April 1990.
107 ECtHR, Modinos v. Cyprus, Application No. 15070/89, Judgment of 22 April 1993, para. 
20.
108 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken 
Declaration, 19 February 2010, Action Plan, lett. C. See also zAgreBelSKy, “La Conferenza di 
Interlaken per assicurare l’avvenire della Corte europea dei diritti umani”, DUDI, 2010, p. 309 
ff.
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light of the relevant case law. This would reinforce the States’ obligation to prevent 
Convention violations. However, experience has shown that there is a lack of uni-
formity among the Contracting States when it comes to recognising the authority 
of the case law of the ECtHR. We can observe at least two main tendencies on this 
point in Contracting States’ legal orders.
Firstly, there is the model of the United Kingdom’s 1998 Human Rights Act. 
Section 2(1) of this Act specifies that national courts “must take into account” any 
“judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion” of the ECtHR.109 Similarly, 
Article 17 of the Ukrainian Law on the Enforcement of Judgments and the 
Application of the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights110 establishes: 
“Courts shall apply the Convention [ECHR] and the case-law of the [Strasbourg] 
Court as a source of law”. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it is the duty of 
domestic courts to give effect to the principles laid down by the Strasbourg Court as 
governing the Convention rights which the domestic court thinks are relevant to the 
Convention issue which it has to decide. A court is not strictly required to follow 
Strasbourg rulings; but if it acts in a manner incompatible with a Convention right, 
it acts unlawfully.111 However, under this approach, it must be underlined that it is 
often very difficult to determine the exact implications of the ECtHR’s case law for 
a national legal system. 
Due to the growing number of Strasbourg judgments, it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to follow and analyse the actual state of the case law; thus, national 
judges have begun to differentiate between judgments of the Court decided by a 
single judge, those decided by panels of three judges, by Chambers of seven judg-
es, and by a Grand Chamber of seventeen. Finally, the need to take into account 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence normally is guaranteed in national courts applying 
principles that are clearly established by the ECtHR, especially those established 
by Grand Chambers. 
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages in this approach that takes into account 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence. It does not, for example, acknowledge that the ECtHR 
is only laying down minimum guarantees. A close adherence to Strasbourg juris-
prudence has also been criticized as preventing domestic courts from developing 
109 See also in Irish legal order, the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, Section 
4: “Judicial notice shall be taken of the Convention provisions and of (a) any declaration, deci-
sion, advisory opinion or judgment of the European Court of Human Rights established under 
the Convention on any question in respect of which that Court has jurisdiction, […], and a court 
shall, when interpreting and applying the Convention provisions, take due account of the princi-
ples laid down by those declarations, decisions, advisory opinions, opinions and judgments”.
110 Law No. 3477-IV of 23 February 2006.
111 House of Lords, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause Kay and 
others and another (FC) (Appellants) v. London Borough of Lambeth and others (Respondents) 
Leeds City Council (Respondents) v. Price and others and others (FC) (Appellants), 8 March 
2006, [2006] UKHL 10, para. 28. See AmoS, “The Principle of Comity and the Relationship 
between British Courts and the European Court of Human Rights”, YEL, 2009, p. 503 ff.
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an independent role in interpreting the ECHR. Indeed, on the basis of the European 
Convention, the ECtHR does not have an exclusive interpreting role: national courts 
could have an independent role.112 More fundamentally, this attitude toward close 
adherence to Strasbourg jurisprudence means that it is difficult to have an effec-
tive dialogue between ECtHR and national courts. The majority of courts in the 
Contracting States do not take the view that they are effectively bound by Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. But there are a growing number of examples in the practice of States 
suggesting that the interpretative authority of the ECtHR is currently increasing.113 
In these jurisdictions, there are usually written Constitutions including a domes-
tic Bill of Rights, so that precedence can be given to the rights contained in the 
Constitution. Thus, the application of the case law of the ECtHR in national legal 
systems is moderated by the exception of the case of non-compliance of the judg-
ments with the fundamental principles of the national constitutional system.
In Germany, for instance, national authorities and courts are under an obligation 
to take into account the decision of the ECtHR in the domestic sphere, which means 
“taking notice of the Convention provision as interpreted by the ECtHR and apply-
ing it to the case, provided the application does not violate prior-ranking law, in 
particular constitutional law”.114 However, according to the Federal Constitutional 
Court, there is a further possibility of non-compliance with the rulings of the 
ECtHR. It concerns the execution of judgments of the ECtHR in the context of 
national litigation which needs to strike a balance between the numerous diverging 
interests of the parties concerned and is characterised by “multipolar legal relations 
connected with fundamental rights”,115 as is often the case, for instance, in family 
law and the protection of personality rights.116
112 See CAnnizzAro, cit. supra note 58, p. 183; nollKAemper, cit. supra note 58, pp. 196-
197.
113 See, i.e. some recent decisions of national courts that refer to the decisions of the ECtHR, 
which did not involve their States. Belgium: Cour de Cassation de Belgique, arrêt, P.09.0547.F/1, 
10 June 2009; Cyprus: Yiallourou v. Evgenios Nicolaou, Judgment of 8 May 2001, Civil Action 
No. 9931; FYROM: Bitola Court of Appeal, Case No. 232/2008; Russia: Supreme Court, 
Judgment 21-Г10-2 of 27 July 2010; Switzerland: Federal Court Decision ATF 131 (2005) 455; 
Turkey: Constitutional Court of Turkey, Judgment No. 2003/33 of 10 April 2003.
114 BVerfGE 111, 307, cit. supra note 22, para. 62. See further pApier, “Execution and 
Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the Perspective of 
German National Courts”, HRLJ, 2006, p. 1 ff.; tomuSChAt, “The Effects of the Judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights According to the German Constitutional Court”, German 
Law Journal, 2010, p. 513 ff.
115 BVerfGE 111, 307, cit. supra note 22, para. 50.
116 See comments of pApier (President of the German Federal Constitutional Court), 
“Execution and effects of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the German 
judicial system”, in Dialogue Between Courts, European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe, Strasburg, 2006, available at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/368D4336-5150-
4F83-86A1-18957F0F778E/0/Dialogue_between_judges_2006.pdf>: “In our opinion, a me-
chanical execution of the ECHR’s judgment in such cases is out of the question because, due to 
the nature of an individual application to the ECHR, which confers the capacity of party to the 
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In Austria, the European Convention enjoys constitutional rank and Austrian 
courts, especially the Constitutional Court, cite regularly and extensively 
Convention articles as well as Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, already in its 
1987 Miltner judgment the Constitutional Court made it clear that there would be 
limits to its adherence to Strasbourg judgments, and if the ECtHR pushed its inter-
pretative function too far, it would not be able to follow it.117 This judgment has not 
yet been overturned.
2.3.1. Effects of the ECtHR’s Case Law and the Approach of the Italian 
Constitutional Court 
An interesting approach on the question of the effects of the case law of the 
ECtHR is provided by the recent jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court.
As argued above, the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court has clari-
fied that Article 117(1) of the Constitution must not be seen as recognising a hierar-
chical superiority of the European Convention rules over the Constitution. The Court 
describes a system in which constitutional rules will have to be interpreted in line 
with the European Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR when the Convention 
provides a higher standard of protection for human rights than the system of con-
stitutional rights protection.118 Finally, the jurisprudence of the Corte Costituzionale 
took a step further in recognizing that the interpretation of the European Convention 
by the Strasbourg Court had binding effect and that Italian courts could not therefore 
adopt interpretations of the Convention that diverge from those of the ECtHR. The 
Court based its view on the consideration that, under Article 32 ECHR, the ECtHR 
is charged with the role of interpreting the provisions of the Convention.119
The view of the Corte Costituzionale on this point seems to be too far-reach-
ing. The binding effect of the ECtHR’s case law within the domestic legal order 
was not explicitly provided for by Article 32 ECHR, which only described the 
scope of jurisdiction of the ECtHR. Admittedly, final judgments rendered in cases 
in which Italy is a respondent State are formally binding upon it. However, in all 
other cases the weight to be given to the ECtHR’s case law varies depending on 
proceedings only to the applicant and the respondent State, such execution cannot do equal jus-
tice in every case to the conflicting interests of the various parties in the national litigation”.
117 Austrian Constitutional Court, Miltner, 14 October 1987, VfSlg 11500/1987, available at: 
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Vfgh>.
118 Corte Costituzionale, Judgments Nos. 348 and 349 of 2007, cit. supra note 46. See the 
references ibid.
119 Corte Costituzionale, Judgment No. 317 of 2009, cit. supra note 55. See CAnnizzAro, 
“Il bilanciamento fra diritti fondamentali e l’art. 117, 1° comma, Cost.”, RDI, 2010, p. 128 ff.; 
nApoletAno, cit. supra note 46, p. 194 ff.; Corte Costituzionale, FV, 4 December 2009, Judgment 
No. 317, English excerpts and commentary by CAligiuri, International Law in Domestic Courts, 
ILDC 1491 (IT 2009).
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the circumstances. Thus, when a certain interpretation by the ECtHR is supported 
by settled jurisprudence or by recent judgments of the Grand Chamber, little room 
is left to domestic courts for the adoption of a different interpretation: in such 
cases, deviation from an established interpretation may amount to a violation of 
the European Convention. 
The situation is different when a specific interpretation of the Convention is 
merely supported by old decisions of the ECtHR or, more generally, by a decision 
which does not reflect the established case law of the ECtHR. While all of the 
ECtHR’s decisions obviously have the same formal value, it may be held that na-
tional courts would be justified if they accorded less deference to certain decisions 
because of the time elapsed since their adoption or because they do not form part 
of an established jurisprudence. National courts, by adopting a novel interpretation, 
may play an important role in persuading the ECtHR to clarify or change its juris-
prudence. Conversely, the rigid view adopted by the Corte Costituzionale implies 
that domestic courts will be able to influence the interpretation of the European 
Convention only in cases in which the ECtHR has not already interpreted particular 
European Convention rules. Such cases are likely to be quite rare.
The decision of the Corte Costituzionale touches upon the issue of the dialogue 
between the ECtHR and national courts. Such a dialogue seems desirable insofar as 
it can promote a dynamic interpretation of the European Convention, as a result of 
which a higher level of human rights protection might be attained. 
2.3.2. Final Remarks on the Active Role of the Contracting States as regards the 
Interpretation of the European Convention
In conclusion, the practice of Contracting States provides numerous examples 
of how well-regarded the interpretative authority of the ECtHR is by their domestic 
courts. This approach leaves national judges free to develop an independent inter-
pretation of the European Convention on the basis of classic international rules 
on the interpretation of treaties. Even the strict UK legal system leaves domestic 
judges little room for interpreting the European Convention. Recently, in In re P 
case, the House of Lords has decided on a case of interpretation of the concept 
of discrimination on grounds of marital status as regards eligibility for adoption, 
in the absence of ECtHR case law on this issue. In this case, the majority agreed 
that “section 2(1) of the 1998 Act allows for the possibility of a dialogue between 
Strasbourg and the courts of the United Kingdom over the meaning of an article of 
the Convention but makes this likely to be a rare occurrence”.120
120 House of Lords, In re P and others, cit. supra note 26, Opinion of Lord Hoffman, para. 
35.
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Thus, a very important means of dialogue is through judgments. In fact, through 
its judgments, a national court can send a message to the ECtHR, which reflects its 
interpretation of the European Convention, and thus influence the direction of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR is not bound to accept what national courts say, but in the Roche 
case it has gone a long way towards recognising the role of superior national 
courts.121 On this basis, the ECtHR could be willing, in specific cases, to depart 
from its previous case law in light of disagreement expressed by a superior national 
court. 
The dialogue between national legal systems and the conventional system is 
the only means which seems able to ensure a high standard of protection of human 
rights in Europe. It must be borne in mind that the conventional system ensures the 
lowest common denominator of protection of rights. This minimum standard may 
be raised by the ECtHR only through an evolutionary interpretation taking into ac-
count the principles established in the most advanced protection systems of some 
Contracting States.
Another type of dialogue between the ECtHR and the national legal systems 
could be used. Contracting States should take due notice of the developments in 
the ECtHR’s case law, because they might have a direct interest in the outcome of 
cases against other States. They should also intervene as third parties (Article 36 
ECHR) to serve their interests, as many countries did, for example, in the case of 
A. v. United Kingdom on parliamentary immunities122 or in the case Lautsi v. Italy 
on the crucifix.123 Furthermore, each State could play an important role in pushing 
the ECtHR to clarify or change its leading jurisprudence, for example by proposing 
that it should take national case law into account.
Finally, the best way to build a stable form of dialogue between ECtHR and 
national courts would be to “reflect on the advisability of introducing a proce-
dure allowing the highest national courts to request advisory opinions from the 
[European] Court”.124
121 ECtHR, Roche v. United Kingdom, Application No. 32555/96, 19 October 2005, para. 
120: “Where […] the superior national courts have analysed in a comprehensive and convincing 
manner the precise nature of the impugned restriction, on the basis of the relevant Convention 
case-law and principles drawn therefrom, this Court would need strong reasons to differ from the 
conclusion reached by those courts by substituting its own views for those of the national courts 
on a question of interpretation of domestic law [...] and by finding, contrary to their view, that 
there was arguably a right recognised by domestic law”.
122 ECtHR, A v. United Kingdom, Application No. 35373/97, 17 December 2002.
123 ECtHR, Lautsi v. Italy [GC], Application No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011.
124 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Izmir 
Declaration, 27 April 2011.

